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COMMENTS
PARENTS' RIGHT TO PRESCRIBE RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
The right to control the religious education and training of minor
children usually presents itself for determination in guardianship, adop-
tion and custodial proceedings incidental to the decease or divorce of
the parents. The problem of determining who shall control the religious
education of the children is of particular significance where the divorced
parents, being of different religious beliefs, are vying for this right.
Either because of the basic differences in religions or because of the
animosity generated in the divorce proceedings manifesting itself in
this divergence of desire, parents enter courtrooms with preconceived
notions as to the religion in which their children are to be tutored. The
courts of this country and England have been confronted with this
paradox-a true paradox when one recognizes the individual natural
right of the parents of a child to determine the church in which tenets
the child will be reared-and have attempted to solve it in various ways.
It shall be the purpose of this comment to discuss the different views
adopted by the courts in solving the question as to who, of the natural
parents, shall control the religious training and education of minor
children.
In nineteenth century England,' the question had long been settled
in favor of the father. He had the paramount and absolute right to con-
trol the religious education of his children during his life.2 The insistence
by the English courts of that era that a child should be brought up in
his father's religion is illustrated by this quotation:
In no case, that I am aware of, where the father has been alive, has the court
disregarded his wishes concerning the religious education of his children,
unless ... he has been.., of such bad conduct that the court . . . altogether
. . . deprive him of the custody of his children.8
1 Prior to this time there was an absence of litigation in the English courts on the
part of parents to protect any parental rights involving the religious education of their
children. As early as 1590, the Elizabethan government suppressed all religious edu-
cation other than that of the Church of England, and by 1699 it was a crime punishable
by life imprisonment for any Papist to teach school. Friedman, The Parental Right
To Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485 (1916).
2In Re Scanlan, L.R. 40 Ch. 200 (1888); In Re Clarke, L.R. 21 Ch. 817 (1882);
Re Agar-Ellis, L.R. 10 Ch. 49 (1878); Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, L.R. 6 Ch. 539
(1871); In Re Newbery, L.R. 1 Ch. 263 (1866); Austin v. Austin, 34 Beav. 257 (1865);
In Re Hunt, 2 Con. & L. 373 (1843); Talbot v. Shrewsbury, 4 My. & Cr. 672 (1840).
8 In Re Newton, L.R. 1 Ch. 740, 748 (1896); In Re McGrath, L.R. 1 Ch. 143 (1893).
83
o-.r DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Upon the death of the father, in the absence of any expression of his
desire, it was presumed that he would have wished that the child be
raised in his religion, although, he, in fact, may have neglected or aban-
doned its precepts. 4 Thus, in the case of Hawksworth v. Hawksworth,5
the court ruled against the surviving mother's wishes as to the religious
training of the child and sustained the unpracticed faith of the deceased
father as the faith in which the child was to be educated. Recognizing the
peculiarity of this principle, the court said:
It seems a strange extension of the father's rights when he is in the grave,
to allow his expressed wishes, and still more his merely presumed wishes
to override the rights of the living parents. 6
Nevertheless, the court applied the rule against which it spoke so
directly.7
Strictly speaking it was not an arbitrary rule which the English
courts applied. It was the father's expressed or presumed wish which
the court enforced on the not uncommon rationale that the father is
the head of the household, exercising the absolute right and undertaking
the responsibility nature gave him through the birth of the child, for
the interest of the child, the family and the public welfare. The courts
would not interfere with the choice of the father unless his right had
been abandoned, 8 or his religious,9 moral, 10 or political". opinions con-
sidered detrimental to the child's welfare.
This harsh rule was enforced even when the result was to "... create
a barrier between a widowed mother and her only child; to annul the
mother's influence on her daughter on the most important of all subjects,
4 Re Foulds, 12 Ont. L.R. 245 (1906); In Re Grey, 2 Ir. 684 (1902); In Re Scanlan,
L.R. 40 Ch. 200 (1888).
5 L.R. 6 Ch. 539 (1871).
6 Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, as cited in Friedman, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485, 490
(1916).
7 "There may be a difference of opinion as to whether the rule of law is really such
as it is desirable to have in the case where the mother is of a different religion from
the father, and the father has died without giving any express directions as to the re-
ligion in which the child is to be brought up. I can quite conceive that many persons
might think that it would be for the interest of the child in such cases that the mother
be allowed to educate the child in her own religion; but that is not the rule of law.
The rule of law is, that the religion of the father is to prevail over the religion of the
mother, even in such a case .. ." Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, as cited in Friedman,
29 Harv. L. Rev. 485, 490 (1916).
8 Friedman, op. cit. supra note 1.
aAndrews v. Salt, L.R. 8 Ch. 622 (1873); Thomas v. Roberts, 19 L.J. 506 (1850);
Lyons v. Blenkin, Jac. 245 (1821).
10In Re Besant, L.R. 11 Ch. 508 (1879); Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jac. 266 (1821).
The poet, Shelley, was denied custody of his children from their maternal grandmother
because he was a self-declared atheist.
11 De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 52 (1804).
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with the almost inevitable effect of weakening it on all others; to intro-
duce a disturbing element into a union which ought to be as close, as
warm, and as absolute as any known to man .... "12
In time, new development of thought and the harshness of prior
decisions in settling the rival claims between members of different faiths
led to the passage of the Guardianship and Infants' Act.13 It had the
effect of abolishing the superior right of the father, and established
the principle that the infant's welfare is of paramount importance and
consideration.
It is interesting to note that a Canadian case contemporaneous with
the old English cases held that a mother, having the right to bring up
the child, had also the right to prescribe its religious education without
considering the father's desire.14
In the United States, the resolution of any controversy concerning
religious education of children stemming from rival beliefs cannot be
disposed of by the courts through the favoring of one religious faith
over another. Liberty of religious worship is a fundamental right
of American citizenship protected by the Constitution.15 "The law knows
no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma. . ".."16 The
state ". . . looks with an equal eye upon all forms of so-called Christianity,
and subjects no one to any disability for rejecting Christianity.' 1 7 Also
"... all Christian denominations stand on the same footing in the eye
of the law.' 8 Thus, the nature of religions involved in litigation is
immaterial.
The convenient but harsh religio sequitur patrem of the early English
cases has received little support in the United States. Some jurisdictions
have, however, adopted this rule. The Supreme Court of Florida has
relied on the old doctrine, saying:
n .. he, . . . as their father, has the legal right . . . to have them educated
in any religious faith that he sees proper, whose tenets do not inculcate
violation of the laws of the land. 19
12 Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, L.R. 6 Ch. 539, 540 (1871).
13 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 45 § 1 (1925). "Where in any proceeding before any court.
the custody or upbringing of an infant ... is in question, the court, in deciding that
question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consider-
ation, arid shall not take into consideration .. .the claim of the father, or any right
at common law possessed by the father, in respect of such ... upbringing... superior
to that of the mother..."
14Ex Parte Ham, 27 L.C. Jur. 127 (1883). 15 U.S. Const., First Amendment.
16 Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728 (1871).
17 In Re Doyle, 16 Mo. App. 159, 166 (1884).
'8 In Re Turner, 19 N.J. Eq. 433, 435 (1868).
19 Hernandez v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 528, 39 So. 641, 645 (1905). Critically examined
in In Re Flynn, 87 N.J. Eq. 413, 100 Ad. 861 (Ch. Ct., 1917).
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Citing an early English case, In Re Jacquet2° held that, even contrary
to his own wishes, a guardian must raise his ward as a Catholic, in accord-
ance with the natural father's direction. The court said: "I believe the
welfare of infants is best promoted by bringing them up in the faith of
their fathers."'2 1 Also, in the case of In Re Lamb's Estate22 the lower New
York court again followed the English common law rule.23 Today, New
York has supposedly abrogated its former common law view and the
rights of parents are, in the absence of misconduct, held to be equal in
regard to the care, nurture, education and welfare of the children.24 In
cases of parental dispute the welfare of the child has been considered
of paramount importance. 25 But the highest tribunal in New York
has held that the question of a child's religious education is purely an
internal affair of the home, where the courts should not venture. In
People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson,26 where a disagreement arose between the
parents over the education of their child, the court said:
The court cannot regulate by its processes the internal affairs of the home.
Dispute between the parents when it does not involve anything immoral or
harmful to the welfare of the child is beyond the reach of the law. The vast
majority of matters concerning the upbringing of children must be left to
the conscience, patience and self-restraint of the father and mother. No
end of difficulties would arise should judges try to tell parents how to bring
up their children.27
In a subsequent lower New York case it was held that the religious
upbringing of children is a matter of public policy of such dignity and
stature that where the parents cannot agree, the court has the duty of
determination.2  This decision renders slightly dubious the outcome
of future litigation in New York on this problem.
In a recent New Jersey case, 29 where custody of minor children was
20 40 Misc. 575, 82 N.Y. Supp. 986 (Surr. Ct., 1903).
21 In Re McCannon, 60 Misc. 22, 25, 112 N.Y. Supp. 590, 592 (Surr. Ct., 1908).
22 78 Misc. 325, 139 N.Y. Supp. 685 (Surr. Ct., 1912).
23 Ibid., at 690. The court, quoting Blackstone, said, "The father, even yet, in con-
templation of our common law, is priest and king in his own household.... Even if he
is an unworthy father .... he retains a right to regulate the religious training of his
infant child."
24 New York Domestic Relations Law, c. 19, § 81 (1909). Also N.J. Laws, 2 Comm.
St., § 21, p. 2810 (1902).
25 Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (S.Ct., 1947); In Re Vardinakis, 160 Misc.
13, 289 N.Y. Supp. 355 (Dom. Rel. Ct., 1936).
26 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E. 2d 660 (1936).
27 Ibid., at 287 and 661.
28 Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (S.Ct., 1947).
29 Donahue v. Donahue, 142 N.J. Eq. 701, 61 A. 2d 243 (Ct. Ap., 1948).
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awarded in a divorce proceeding to the mother who thereafter raised
her children in accordance with her religious faith, chancery refused
to interfere on application of the father, holding:
Under what circumstance, if any, a court would be justified in intervening
with respect to the religious training selected by a parent having custody
need not here be considered. . . . Intervention in matters of religion is a
perilous adventure upon which the judiciary should be loathe to embark. ' '30
The Supreme Court of Kansas in applying the "hands off" doctrine
held that aside from teachings subversive of decency and morality
".. . the courts have no authority over that part of a child's training
which consists in religious discipline. .. ."31 The reluctance of the courts
to project themselves into so personal and controversial an area is perhaps
understandable.8 2
There is a third view, which might be considered the middle-of-the-
road position, wherein courts consider the question of religious education
from the standpoint of what is best for the child. In Purington v. Jam-
rock,33 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in dealing with
a custody dispute between a father and a mother, the parties being of
different religious beliefs, said:
But in such a case as this it is not the rights of the parents that are chiefly
to be considered. The first and paramount duty is to consult the welfare
of the child. The wishes of the parent as to the religious education and
surroundings of the child are entitled to weight; if there is nothing to put in
the balance against them, ordinarily they will be decisive.8 4 If, however,
those wishes cannot be carried into effect without sacrificing what the
court sees to be for the welfare of the child, they must so far be disregarded.
The court will not itself prefer one church to another, but will act without
80 Ibid., at 703-704 and 245. See Herr, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, § 83, p. 632
(1950).
81 Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 732, 193 Pac. 307, 311 (1920). See, for the nonsec-
tarian character of our governmental system as applied to religious education: People
v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 537, 104 N.E. 2d 895 (1952); Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161,
100 N.E. 2d 463 (1951); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399 (1923); In Re Blackburn, 41 Mo. App. 622 (1890);
In Re Doyle, 16 Mo. App. 159 (1884).
32 To a petition for an order specifying what religious faith an infant was to be
brought up in, the court replied, "I find no authority.. . in the United States sus-
taining the exercise of such a power. The whole trend of the American decisions ...
seems to limit the cognizance which the court may take of the religion of the parents
to the function of appointing guardians and awarding custody of infants." In Re Flynn,
87 N.J. Eq. 413, 423, 100 Atl. 861, 865 (Ch. Ct., 1917). Cf. Ex Parte Kananack, 272 App.
Div. 783, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 889 (S.Ct., 1947). See 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (2d ed.,
1945), S 15.13, p. 183.
83 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907).
84 The parents' faith is prima facie the infant's religion. F. v. F., 1 Ch. 688 (1902).
Also cases cited notes 18, 20, 22 supra.
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bias for the welfare of the child under the circumstances of each case. This is
the fair consensus of judicial opinion, although a difference of circumstances
has caused the use of different expressions and the reaching of different
results in the different cases. 35
This view represents the great weight of authority in the United
States and England today.36
However, in applying the principle that the court's action is to be
governed by the best interests of the child, what binding force and
effect should be given an antenuptial agreement between the parents
as to the religious education of prospective children?
In one view, no mere agreement as to the religious education of
children, whether it be made before37 or after 38 marriage, is binding
and it is always open to the acceding parent to change his mind, as it
is his privilege to inculcate in his children those religious principles
which, at any time, seem best to him. Some decisions base this fundamental
principle, i.e., the right of a parent arbitrarily, and perhaps capriciously
to change his mind, on public policy. Accordingly, a parent should
not be held to bind himself irrevocably to an agreement relinquishing
control over his children's religious education and this right is vested
in the parent for the benefit of his children.3 9 Other authorities, pre-
dominantly English, rest their decisions on practical considerations arising
out of family life.40
The opposite position was taken by a lower New York court in
Rarnon v. Ramon,41 which enforced the antenuptial agreement, without
considering the question of the child's welfare, on the basis that the
husband was entitled to the wife's consortium which included any obliga-
tions the wife had taken upon herself (antenuptial agreement) when she
35 Parington v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199-200, 80 N.E. 802, 805 (1907).
36Boerger v. Boerger, 97 A. 2d 419 (N.J., 1953); Gerst v. Gerst, 349 IIl. App. 201,
110 N.E. 2d 470 (1953); Nye v. Nye, 411 I11. 408, 105 N.E. 2d 300 (1952); Mehrhoff
v. Moore, 348 Ill. App. 224, 108 N.E. 2d 791 (1952); Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal. App. 2d 563,
161 P. 2d 385 (1945); Parks v. Cook, 180 S.W. 2d 64 (Mo. Ct. App., 1944); People v.
Woolston, 135 Misc. 320, 329 N.Y. Supp. 185 (S.Ct., 1929); Re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa.
479, 109 At!. 683 (1920); consult, also, 36 Col. L. Rev. 678 (1936).
37 Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910); Re Nevin, 2 Ch. 299
(1891); Re Walsh, L.R. Ir. 13 Eq. 269 (1884); Andrews v. Salt, L.R. 8 Ch. 622 (1873);
In Re Clarke, L.R. 21 Ch. 817 (1882); In Re Newton, L.R. 1 Ch. 740 (1896); Re Agar-
Ellis, L.R. 10 Ch. 49 (1878).
3 8 Condon v. Vollum, 57 L.T.N.S. 154 (1887); D'Alton v. D'Alton, L.R. 4 Prob.
Div. 87 (1878); Vansittart v. Vansittart, 4 Kay. & J. 62 (1858); In Re Besant, L.R.
11 Ch. 508 (1879).
39 Case cited note 35 supra.
40 In Re Browne, 2 Ir. Ch. Rep. 151 (1852).
4134 N.Y.S. 2d 100 (N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct., 1942).
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entered into the marital union.4 2 The Ramon case was cited by the New
York Supreme Court in Shearer v. Shearer,43 but the court made its posi-
don clear when it said that it was charged with a responsibility more
impelling than the religious rights of the father. The controlling con-
sideration was the welfare of the children. The court then determined
that the children's welfare would best be served by enforcing the pre-
nuptial agreement.
In determining what considerations will best serve the interests of the
child, the preference of the child carries some weight, but is not conclu-
sive. 44 The court privately examines the child in chambers, with the
consent of counsel, to determine, if possible, the predilection of the
child. The limitations of such an interview are obvious, as are its dangers,
among them that of influenced judgment. Age and capacity on the part
of the child to make a rational judgment are important considerations.45
In retrospect, the modern principle that the best interests and welfare of
the child are of paramount consideration permits the courts to exercise
their discretion in a manner that will meet the circumstances of each case.
This approaches justice more closely than do rigid doctrines under which
the court either directs the child to be raised in its father's religion (the
former English rule) or finds that it cannot deal with the problem at
all (the Sisson doctrine).
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX LAW-TRANSFERS
IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
Those portions of the Federal Estate Tax law which have provided for
the taxation of transfers made in contemplation of death have always been
the subject of a large part of the litigation inv6lving estate tax liability.
This subject has also been a source of constant frustration to the Con-
gressional Committees who from the beginning have realized that large
amounts of money and property were being withdrawn from the opera-
tion of the estate tax by gifts inter vivos under circumstances which clear-
ly indicated that, but for the gifts, all of those amounts would have been
taxed as a part of the donors' estates and that by far the greater number
42 Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, 183 N.E. 429 (1932); People ex rel.
Rich v. Lackey, 139 Misc. 42, 248 N.Y. Supp. 561 (1930); Matter of Mancini, 89 Misc.
83, 151 N.Y. Supp. 387 (S. Ct., 1915); In Re Luck, 10 Ohio S.&C.P. (1899); Denton
v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920); consult Williston on Contracts, S 1744 A,
p. 4939.
43 73 N.Y. S. 2d 337 (S.Ct., 1947).
44 Callen v. Gill, 7 N.J. 312, 81 A. 2d 495 (1951).
45 Cf. Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, L.R. 6 Ch. 539 (1871); Richards v. Collins, 45
N.J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. 831 (1889); Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 721 (1944).
